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BANK LENDING SPECIAL?
Charles P. Himmelberg and Donald P. Morgan*
Is bank lending special? There are good reasons to ask. Absent good
substitutes for bank lending, shocks to the supply of bank loans result-
ing from changes in monetary policy, bank capital, or bank portfolio
preferences will affect the spending of bank borrowers. This implies new
ways of thinking about the transmission of monetary policy. In addition
to the familiar money/interest rate channel, there will be an additional
"lending channel" (Bernanke and Blinder 1988). Moreover, monetary
shocks will be borne by the borrowers who depend heavily on banks
for loans.
In recent years, some observers have asked whether bank lending
is still special, since banks have lost market share to financial markets
and other intermediaries. For example, commercial banks’ share of non-
financial borrowing declined from approximately 36 percent in 1974 to
about 22 percent in 1993 (Edwards and Mishkin 1994). In view of such
trends, Edwards (1993) has suggested that the notion that banks are
special is "obsolete."
This paper marshals theory and evidence to argue that bank lending
is still special. In the first section we begin with some perspective on
recent trends on business borrowing. We show that the manufacturing
sector has not reduced its dependence on banks, and small firms still
borrow almost exclusively from banks. Using a second data set that
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allows the identification of intermediated debt (but unfortunately not
bank versus nonbank), we also show that the large majority of manu-
facturing firms use only intermediated debt, and that the employment
share of such firms is large.
To explain why some firms still rely on banks and intermediaries,
the next section reviews the theory of financial contracting. Initially, we
follow the literature and distinguish between direct borrowing in public
debt markets and intermediated borrowing. (Thus, in this section "bank"
and "intermediary" are used interchangeably; a later section will distin-
guish between bank and nonbank intermediaries.) This theoretical
literature argues that well-known, high-quality firms can borrow di-
rectly with simple bond and commercial paper contracts, while more
information-problematic firms rely on short-term, secured loan con-
tracts with complex covenants.1 We review a variety of existing studies
supporting the view that intermediaries are more efficient than direct
lenders at monitoring and renegotiating these complex contracts.
In the third section we present new evidence in support of this
view. First, we report regression results showing that reliance on inter-
mediated debt varies with firm size and other common proxies for
agency problems. Second, for firms that borrow exclusively from inter-
mediaries, we show that reliance on short-term debt varies with these
same measures of agency problems. Since most short-term borrowing is
from banks, this evidence supports the view that bank lending is special
for "information-problematic" firms.
In contrast to the second section, in which the discussion did not
distinguish among intermediaries, the fourth section argues that banks
differ from nonbank intermediaries--specifically, insurance companies
and finance companies. We argue that because insurance companies
have longer-term liabilities, they have a cost advantage in long-term
lending, while the short-term liabilities of banks and finance companies
make it cheaper for them to lend over the short term. Because short-term
debt is a way to control agency problems, smaller, more information-
intensive firms will tend to borrow more from banks and finance
companies than from insurance companies. And for such firms, finance
comPany loans would appear to be close substitutes for bank loans. But
the evidence shows that finance companies specialize in leasing and
lending against assets with thick secondary markets, such as automo-
biles, aircraft, and retail furnishings. Thus, firms with highly specialized
or intangible assets may find it difficult (expensive) to substitute finance
company loans for bank loans.
1 We use the terms "low-quality" and "high-quality" to refer to the degree of infor-
mation asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. This is conceptually different from
risk, which in general may be correlated with quality, but is otherwise distinct.IS BANK LENDING SPECIAL? 17
We conclude that bank lending is still special for some business
borrowers. Smaller, lower-quality borrowers still require intensive
screening and monitoring by intermediaries. Some low-quality firms can
borrow from insurance companies but many do not. Only firms with
easily collateralized assets seem able to borrow from finance companies.
For the remainder of firms, bank lending is still special, thus establishing
an important necessary condition for the existence of a lending channel.
PERSPECTIVE ON RECENT TRENDS
IN BUSINESS BORROWING
In view of recent claims that banks are dead, we present some
evidence that bank are still vital players in the commercial lending
business. We stress commercial lending because the increasing securi-
tization of consumer loans and mortgage loans means banks can
originate such loans without funding them with deposits. Smaller,
information-intensive business borrowers, we argue, still depend on
banks and other intermediaries for credit.
Because total indebtedness rose during the 1980s, Boyd and Gertler
(1994) have pointed out that a more informative way to judge the
importance of banks as business lenders is to measure bank loans
relative to GDP (Figure 1). Even after the spectacular decline between
1989 and 1993, bank loans to nonfinancial business are still a larger share
of GDP now than over most of the 1960s. And although it is too early to
pronounce a trend, it is notable that the dramatic decline abated in 1994.
It is also instructive to measure bank loans as a fraction of nonfi-
nancial business credit (Figure 2). These data understate business
lending by banks to some extent because they exclude business mort-
gages held by banks. Even so, banks have provided a substantial and
remarkably stable share of credit to nonfinancial business. While the
share of credit from other sources shows pronounced trends over the
last 40 years, the share from banks has been stable in comparison.
Banks’ share averaged 22 percent between 1952 and 1987 and never
deviated from a range between 20 and 26 percent. Banks’ share dipped
below 20 percent for the first time in 1987 but it has since increased to
18.5 percent--still a substantial share and considerably more than
finance companies’ share. Note also that, while the share of credit raised
directly in the commercial paper market has risen steadily since 1966, it
is still less than 4 percent of nonfinancial business credit.
Table 1 narrows the focus to manufacturing firms. The table shows
that their reliance on banks has not declined over the decade ending last
year. This is notable because many observers have argued that lower
information costs have allowed nonbank lenders to displace banks in
lending to information-intensive borrowers. However, manufacturers’18 Charles P. Himmelberg and Donald P. Morgan
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specialized assets and R&D intensity would seem to make them espe-
cially problematic borrowers, and they are still bank dependent.
Table 1 also shows that smaller manufacturers are especially bank
dependent. In either decade shown, commercial banks held roughly
two-thirds of the debt of firms with assets under $25 million. We divided
the data into only two groups, but Gertler and Hubbard (1988) docu-
ment that the inverse relationship between bank dependence and size is
monotonic across many size classes.
Table 1
Percent of Manufacturers’ Debt Owed to Banks
1975-84 1985-94
All Firms 31 32
Assets < $25 Million 62 66
Assets > $25 Million 26 28
Note: The averages in the first column for firms greater than and less than $25 million are for the years
198044.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Quarterly Financial Reports.IS BANK LENDING SPECIAL? 19
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The most recent survey evidence indicate that smaller firms gener-
ally-not just manufacturers--still borrow almost exclusively from
banks. The National Federation of Independent Business periodically
surveys its 500,000 members about their sources of funds. Banks were
the source of 84 percent of the loans in 1980 and 86 percent in 1987, the
latest year available (Scott and Dunkelberg 1985; Dennis, Dunkelberg,
and Van Hulle 1988). The Federal Reserve Board’s National Survey of
Small Business Finance (NSSBF) in 1987 tells the same story. Banks (and
other depository institutions) supplied 89.4 percent of the firms with
their most recent loan. Fewer than 1 percent of the firms reported that
their most recent loan came from a finance company.
The aggregate data in Figure 2 might suggest to some observers that
all firms are borrowing more in the commercial paper (CP) and bond
markets and less from banks and intermediaries. The data in Table 2,
however, indicate that a relatively small number of firms issued public
debt of either type, even as late as 1992. The table divides 5,359 firms
listed in the Compustat data base in 1992 into three mutually exclusive
groups: firms rated for commercial paper, those rated to issue bonds but20 Charles P. Himmelberg and Donald P. Morgan
Table 2
Reliance on Intermediated vs. Public Debt by Firms on Compustat~1992
Commercial Bonds but No Intermediated
Paper Issuers Commercial Paper Debt Only
Number of Firms 351 544 4,364
Percent of Firms 6.6 10.3 83.0
Employment (millions) 13.3 7.4 8.2
Percent of Employment
in Sample 46.2 25.5 28.3
Note: Rows may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding.
Source: Standard & Poor’s Compustat.
not commercial paper, and those with neither rating ("Intermediated
Debt Only").
Only a small fraction of firms, 16.9 percent, is rated to issue either
type of public debt. The commercial paper market comprises an espe-
cially select group of only 351 firms, under 7 percent of the sample. The
vast majority of firms, 83 percent, borrow only from intermediaries.
Although these are small firms, they are important in aggregate; they
employed 8.2 million workers in 1992, or 28.3 percent of employment of
all firms in the sample. Unfortunately, Compustat does not report the
type of intermediary from which firms are borrowing. But it should be
remembered that banks are still the largest financial intermediary in the
United States.
Table 2 indicates that only a select group of firms can issue com-
mercial paper and bonds as substitutes for intermediated debt. The
simple fact is that the vast majority of firms rely exclusively on loans
from intermediaries. The next section draws selectively from the litera-
ture on financial contracting under asymmetric information to explain
why so many firms borrow only through intermediaries.
WHAT MAKES ~NTERMEDIARIES ~~SPECIALfr:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE
The theory of financial contracting under asymmetric information
provides a general framework for understanding why smaller, informa-
tion-intensive borrowers rely on intermediaries. To reduce agency costs,
such firms submit to tight, detailed loan covenants in their debt
contracts. Because the monitoring and renegotiating of these contracts
is costly, however, these tasks are more efficiently delegated to an
intermediary. Intermediaries’ lower monitoring and renegotiation costs
mean they can write covenants that entail more frequent monitoring.
More frequent monitoring, in turn, means intermediaries become better
informed about firms over the length of a relationship. That, we argue,IS BANK LENDING SPECIAL? 21
is why intermediaries--especially banks, but also finance and insurance
companies--are "special," in theory. (In the next to last section we will
consider some differences between bank and nonbank intermediaries.)
In the following sections, we review a variety of evidence showing
that covenants in private debt agreements are tighter and conditional on
more volatile performance than those in public agreements. Even
though private debt covenants are more frequently violated, intermedi-
aries’ flexibility in renegotiating reduces the cost of financial distress. We
also review the contracting view of debt maturity, which predicts that
smaller, more information-problematic borrowers will choose shorter-
term debt. This is because they have higher contracting costs, which
make it expensive to write and enforce covenants to control all possible
agency problems. We conclude with a summary of existing evidence.
Covenants, Monitoring, and Intermediation
Lenders attempt to control agency problems by imposing restric-
tive covenants in lending contracts (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Typical
covenants restrict firms’ dividends and indebtedness and often require
firms to maintain minimums of net worth and working capital. Borrow-
ers are also required to submit regular accounting statements, which
makes it relatively easy to determine if a covenant has been violated.
However, because these covenants are based on noisy indicators of
firms’ true financial health, more intense monitoring is needed to
determine how to handle a violation (Berlin and Loeys 1988).
Modern finance theory views banks and other intermediaries as
delegated monitors (Diamond 1984; Boyd and Prescott 1986). Interme-
diaries are more efficient at monitoring these covenants for at least two
reasons. First, intermediaries are less likely to free-ride on the informa-
tion production of others because they have a larger stake. Thus, the
intermediary is more likely to be informed about the event of a covenant
violation and more likely to monitor to determine if the violation is
serious. Second, intermediaries, acting unilaterally, can renegotiate a
covenant more cheaply than dispersed bondholders. Obtaining the
simple or two-thirds majority vote necessary to amend a bond covenant
is costly and may fail if individual bondholders hold out for a better deal
(Gilson, Kose, and Lang 1990).
The theory of intermediation suggests that, because intermediaries
can renegotiate covenants more easily than public lenders, the cove-
nants in bank contracts can be tighter. In his survey of the studies of
covenant violations, Smith (1993) finds that virtually all of the violations
were of covenants in private rather than public issues. Sweeney (1994)
finds 90 percent of the violations of private covenants were of bank
lending agreements, specifically. These findings suggest that bank
covenants are set more tightly.22 Charles P. Himmelberg and Donald P. Morgan
The covenants in public and private contracts also set their condi-
tions depending upon different types of events. Public bond covenants
tend to set their conditions on events that are relatively easy to verify,
such as a major change in capital structure or a rating downgrading
(Crabbe, Pickering, and Prowse 1990). In contrast, private loan contracts
are conditioned upon performance measures, like working capital and
net worth, that are less easily controlled by managers. Sweeney finds
that these two covenants are the most frequently violated. Since these
covenants require more monitoring, bondholders will be less likely to
impose them (Kahan and Tuckman 1993).
The violation of a financial covenant often triggers financial distress.
The "anatomy" of distress described by Asquith, Gertner, and Sharf-
stein (1994) reveals the flexibility banks have in negotiating with troubled
borrowers.2 When firms missed a payment or violated a covenant, banks
could restructure many terms of the contract: waive covenants, extend
maturity, extend more loans, reduce the line of credit, or require more
collateral. Restructuring would often entail tightening some terms and
relaxing others. For example, banks might waive the violated covenant
but require security against the line of credit or lengthen the maturity.
This flexibility reduces the cost of financial distress. If monitoring
and contracting costs were negligible, firms with good long-run pros-
pects would not be affected by distress; lenders would simply renego-
tiate the debt. Information asymmetries and free-riding by bondholders,
however, may force financially distressed firms into inefficient spending
cutbacks and even bankruptcy.
Gilson, Kose, and Lang (1990) find that financially distressed firms
are more likely to restructure their debt (thus avoiding Chapter 11), the
larger the share of their debt that is owed to banks.3 In particular, banks
were much more likely to extend maturity on the loan than were
bondholders. In contrast, public debt often entails exchanging the
original bonds for ones with shorter maturities in order to prevent hold-
outs. Among Japanese firms in financial distress, Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharfstein (1990) find that those with close bank ties invest more and
sell more than those without close bank ties.
Firm Stock Prices Respond Favorably to
News of Bank Relationships
Banks write tight, detailed loan covenants that entail substantial
monitoring. All else equal, tighter covenants also mean more violations
2 In a sample of 102 distressed junk-bond issuers, banks held 25 percent of the firms’
debt and almost all firms had a revolving line of credit from a bank.
3 Their definition of "banks" includes insurance companies. However only 11
percent of the sample borrowed from insurance companies.IS BANK LENDING SPECIAL? 23
and hence more monitoring. Over the course of this banking relation-
ship--with all the monitoring it entails---banks become better informed
about the firm than public investors. A number of studies investigate
this possibility by investigating how share prices respond to news about
a firm’s banking relationship.
A key finding by James (1987) is that a firm’s stock price rises after
an announcement that it has received a loan agreement from a bank.
This contrasts with a negative (or insignificant) response to announce-
ments of a public bond offering (Smith 1986). Subsequent event studies
show the share response is larger, the closer the relationship and the
smaller the firm.4
Some bank relationships are closer than others, of course. Loans to
larger firms are often syndicated among many borrowers, both to
diversify and to avoid regulatory limits. Preece and Mullineaux (1994b)
point out that as the number of banks in the syndicate increases, the
deal becomes more like a public bond issue, with the attendant prob-
lems of free-riding and higher negotiation costs. Consistent with that
argument, they find that the stock price response to news of a bank loan
agreement weakens as the number of lenders to the firm increases.
An innovative study by Slovin, Sushka, and Poloncheck (1993)
examined a sample of firms that had banking relationships with Conti-
nental Illinois Bank, a bank that appeared bound to fail in the summer
of 1984 until it was rescued by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC). The share prices of these firms fell as Continental’s
prospects diminished over the early summer and then rebounded after
the FDIC announced a rescue. Share prices responded only if Continen-
tal was a direct lender (signed a separate note with the borrower) or was
lead lender in a syndicate, not if Continental was merely a participant
in the syndicate.
Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock (1992) argue that the marginal
information of a bank loan announcement is smaller for large firms
because such firms are already carefully researched by public credit and
equity analysts. In support, they find that stock prices of small firms
increase after the announcement of a bank loan agreement, while stock
prices of large firms are unaffected.
A lending channel requires that the supply of bank loans affect firm
spending. Two recent studies find a link between firms’ spending and
the closeness of their banking relationships. Using a sample of Japanese
firms, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Sharfstein (1991) show that investment by
firms without close banking relationships is constrained by their cash
4 For example, Lumer and McConnell (1989) show that share prices increase only
upon renewal of an existing loan agreement, suggesting banks become better informed
over the course of the relationship.24 Charles P. Himmelberg and Donald P. Morgan
flow, while spending by firms with close banking relationships (firms in
Keiretsu) was unconstrained. This finding suggests that the monitoring
entailed by a close banking relationship reduces agency problems and
lowers the cost of external funds relative to internal funds. However,
banking relationships in the United States cannot be as close as in Japan,
where banks may use both debt and equity. Morgan (1995) argues that
in the United States a banking relationship essentially means that firms
have a loan commitment from a bank, and he shows that investment
by firms with a bank loan commitment is less liquidity constrained than
investment by firms without a commitment.
Short-Term Debt Reduces Agency Costs
In the previous section, we discussed how lenders can impose
covenants in loan agreements in order to keep the option to terminate or
renegotiate the loan if a firm’s balance sheet deteriorates. When these
covenants can be cheaply observed and, if necessary, enforced by
third parties, it is desirable to attach such agreements to long-term debt.
On the other hand, a borrower may be able to increase the riskiness of
its assets without affecting the balance sheet ratios on which covenants
are typically written. In this case, it may be more effective for inter-
mediaries to simply shorten the maturity of the loan, thereby insuring
that the loan can be renegotiated or terminated if the firm’s prospects
deteriorate.
A number of theories in the literature seek to explain the maturity
structure of debt. Barclay and Smith (1993) identified three broad ap-
proaches based on contracting costs, signaling, and taxes. While evi-
dence exists to support each of these approaches, we will restrict our
discussion in this section to the contracting view. The contracting view
argues that short-term debt is useful because it preserves the option for
lenders to terminate or renegotiate a lending arrangement. This option
is valued by lenders, because long-term debt creates an incentive for
borrowers to increase asset risk after taking on debt.
The main testable implication of this view is that firms with severe
information asymmetries and fungible assets (and therefore agency
problems) will borrow more from intermediaries and will also use more
short-term debt. Recent evidence is consistent with these predictions.
Barclay and Smith (1993) and Rajan and Zingales (1993) estimate re-
gressions that show a positive relationship between maturity structure
and proxies for agency problems. In the next section, we extend their
results by estimating a similar model that explains not only the maturity
choice, but also the choice of intermediated debt.IS BANK LENDING SPECIAL? 25
NEW EVIDENCE ON THE DETERMINANTS OF
INTERMEDIATED AND SHORT-TERM DEBT
Our discussion of intermediation and the design of debt contracts
has identified two themes in the literature. First, intermediated debt
dominates public debt when information problems create the need for
continuous (ex post) monitoring of borrowers. Second, lenders prefer
short-maturity debt when information problems make it difficult to
monitor and enforce covenants. In this section, we report new empirical
results that broadly support these two themes.
Using data from Standard & Poor’s Compustat, we constructed a
cross section of 5,108 firms from 1992.5 This sample covers only publicly
traded firms from a number of industries, including manufacturing,
mining, retailing, wholesaling, and services. Compustat does not break
down firms’ debt by source, but it does indicate if a firm has a Standard
& Poor’s rating for bonds or commercial paper. Therefore, we use "no
rating" to identify firms that use only intermediated debt.6
To relate our qualitative measure of intermediation to firm charac-
teristics, we use an ordered probit model in which our indicator is
assumed to be a function of an underlying (latent) variable that indexes
the firm’s "propensity for intermediation." We denote this index by y~
and assume that y~ = x~b + ei, where xi is a vector of firm characteristics
that determine the propensity for intermediation (more on this below).
We then define a discrete dependent variable, y; = 3 if the firm relies
only on intermediated debt (no bonds or commercial paper), Yi = 2 if the
firm is good enough to issue bonds but not commercial paper, and Yi =
1 if the firm is good enough to issue commercial paper. Following the
arguments in Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel (1995), this specifi-
cation assumes that the quality of commercial paper issuers is higher
than that of bond issuers that do not issue commercial paper.7
We also use an ordered probit to model short-term debt because
there are substantial mass points at zero and at one that would create
s We chose 1992 because it is the latest available year for which firms have completely
finished filing their annual reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Our
sample is the same set of 5,259 firms used to construct Table 2, but we removed 151 firms
that had either missing data or large oufliers for the ratios used as regressors.
6 Our reliance on Compustat data may overstate the importance of intermediated debt
by failing to identify some firms that have public debt outstanding. Though virtually all
bond and commercial paper issues are rated by Standard & Poor’s, some small issues are
rated only by Moody’s or other agencies. However, a random sampling of firms rated by
Moody’s indicated that the overlap is more than 95 percent.
7 We get similar results when we specify only two classes, but we sacrifice some
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problems for a standard regression model,s We define Yi = 12 if the
short-term debt ratio is one, Yi = 11 ..... 2 if the ratio falls in deciles 10
through one, respectively, and Yi = 1 if the ratio is zero (we also define
yi = 1 for firms with zero total debt). We estimate the short-term debt
model using only the observations on firms that rely on intermediated
debt, so the estimated model describes the debt maturity structure given
that the firm is borrowing only from intermediaries.
Table 3 reports estimated coefficients for the above models. To
proxy for information and contracting problems, we use several vari-
ables that are standard in the literature. The first two rows of the table
report the coefficients on size variables, where size is measured by the
log of sales (a squared term is included to allow for nonlinearities). In
model 1, the negative coefficient on size confirms that large firms rely
less on intermediated debt. In model 2, this coefficient shows that,
conditional on using intermediated debt, small firms also use more
short-term debt. To the extent that size is a proxy for information
problems, this is consistent with the view that short-term debt is used to
cope with agency problems. Since most commercial and industrial (C&I)
lending by banks is short-term, this finding is also consistent with the
view that small firms rely heavily on banks.
Rows 3 and 4 report the coefficients on capital intensity, defined as
the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to sales9 (a squared term is
again included to allow for nonlinearities). This variable measures the
extent to which the firm uses fixed capital in its production technology,
as opposed to "soft" inputs like materials, labor, and technology. The
prediction is that capital-intensive firms will find it easier to borrow from
public debt markets because fixed capital, unlike technology and other
intangible inputs, is more easily observed by outside investors and
therefore less subject to agency problems. The negative and highly
significant coefficient in model 1 shows that capital-intensive firms are
indeed less likely to require intermediation. Capital intensity is also
important in model 2, which further shows that among intermediated
firms, capital-intensive firms are less likely to use short-term debt.
Among non-capital inputs, R&D expenditures are generally
thought to create more information problems than labor and materials.
We therefore include the ratio of R&D to fixed capital as a proxy for the
importance of (intangible) technological capital (row 5). This variable is
8 Alternatively, we could have modeled short-term debt as a continuous variable with
two-sided censoring. This is more efficient, but less robust. The ordered probit is sufficient
for our purposes given the size of our sample.
9 This variable can also be viewed as a point estimate of the capital share parameter.
That is, if the production function is Cobb-Douglas, then profit maximization implies that
the value of capital divided by the value of sales equals the exponent on capital. The
magnitude of this parameter provides a measure of the firm’s capital intensity.IS BANK LENDING SPECIAL? 27
Table 3
Determinants of Debt Structure
Ordered probit results showing the effect of firm characteristics on debt structure.
Dependent variable in column (1) is classified 3, 2, or 1, respectively, if firm has no rating,
a bond rating but no commercial paper (CP), or a CP rating. In column (2) the dependent
variable is classified 12 if the ratio of short-term to total debt is 1, 11 to 2 if the ratio falls in
deciles 10 through 1, and 1 if total debt is zero. Standard errors appear in parentheses.
Dependent Variable
Model 1: Model 2:
Regressors Intermediated Debt Short-Term Debt
1. Size -1.077"* -.156"*
(.131) (.017)
2. Size, Squared .028"* .002
(.010) (.002)
3. Capital Intensity -.833** -.625**
(.143) (.068)
4. Capital Intensity, Squared .142"* .090**
(.035) (.016)
5. R&D Intensity .036 .096**
(.130) (.023)
6. Investment .314 .565**
(.218) (.079)
7. Short-Term Assets .009 .263**
(. 180) (.081)
8. Industry Dummies (not reported) (not reported)
9. Observations 5108 4273
10. Log-likelihood - 1528.4 -9847.3
Note: Model 2 indicates fewer observations than Model 1 because firms with public debt have been
omitted.
"Size" = the log of total sales; "Capital Intensity" = ratio of fixed capital to sales; "R&D intensity" = ratio
of R&D to fixed capital; "investment" = ratio of capital expenditures to fixed capital; and "Short-Term
Assets" = ratio of inventories to inventories plus fixed capital. Industry dummies described in text.
One-tailed tests significant at the 1 percent level are denoted by **
statistically insignificant in the model for intermediated debt, but it is
positive and highly significant in the model for short-term debt. Thus,
conditional on both size and capital intensity, the effect of R&D on
intermediation is neutral, but R&D-intensive firms clearly rely more
heavily on short-term debt.
The last two variables in the model investment and short-term
assets~are unimportant for public debt, but are highly significant in
the model for debt maturity. The ratio of investment to fixed capital
("investment") is included as a proxy for the growth rate of the28 Charles P. Himmelberg and Donald P. Morgan
firm.10 Higher investment reveals that a lower fraction of future profits
will be generated by existing fixed capital (our capital intensity variable
in rows I and 2 measures only the current fraction). Thus, the scope for
discretionary use of funds is higher, causing lenders to prefer short-term
debt. We also included short-term assets to proxy for agency problems
because such assets are, by definition, reacquired every year and
therefore more subject to risk-shifting or other value-reducing activities.
Our proxy for short-term assets is the ratio of inventories to inventories-
plus-capital, and the estimates in row 7 indicate that lenders indeed
seem to prefer short-term debt for firms with high levels of short-term
assets.
To summarize, the results in Table 3 confirm our discussion of inter-
mediation and short-term debt. In particular, public debt markets are
restricted to large, capital-intensive firms. Such firms are evidently better
known and, because of their heavy reliance on fixed capital, relatively
less prone to agency problems. The vast majority of firms in our sample
rely on intermediated debt. For these firms, size and capital intensity
help the firm gain access to long-term credit. Otherwise, small, high-
tech, rapidly growing, and inventory-intensive firms tend to rely more
on short-term borrowing. Recent theories of intermediation and optimal
debt contracting provide a parsimonious explanation for these facts.
ARE BANKS ~SPECIALrr AMONG INTERMEDIARIES?
The theory and evidence above make a good case that public debt is
not a good substitute for loans from intermediaries. This section takes
up the harder question of whether loans from other intermediaries~
finance and life insurance companies in particular--are good substitutes
for bank loans. We begin with the evidence and end with a discussion
of why those other intermediaries do not provide perfect substitutes for
bank loans.
Ten years ago, Fama (1985) concluded that banks must be different
from other intermediaries, otherwise bank borrowers would not be
willing to bear the reserve tax (since removed) on bank CDs. Economies
of scope between deposit-taking and lending, he argued, give banks an
information advantage over finance companies and other intermediar-
ies. A firm’s deposit history may inform banks, which tend to lend
against cash flow, about a firm’s credit risk. Information on deposit
activity may also make it easier to monitor working capital covenants.
The idea that lending and deposit-taking are complementary is a
10 In a cross section, this is probably the best available indicator of firm’s growth rate.
Using several lags of sales might have generated a more accurate measure, but this would
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venerable one, yet Petersen and Rajan (1994) are the first to provide any
evidence. Using data on individual small firms from the National Survey
of Small Business Finance (NSSBF), they test whether close banking
relationships increase the availability of credit to firms. The strength of
the relationship is measured by its length and by the fraction of debt
borrowed from a lender with whom the firm kept a deposit or purchased
some other financial service from the lender. They find that 64 percent
of the firms have a deposit with their current lender. These relationship
variables significantly increase the availability of credit to firms, which
they measure by the extent to which firms avoid more expensive trade
credit.~1
Using a subset of the NSSBF data, Berger and Udell (1994) find that
firms are charged lower rates and are less likely to post collateral, the
longer the firm has maintained a credit commitment with a bank. They
find a stronger effect on interest rates than Petersen and Rajan (1994)
because they focus on lending under commitments, which entails a
relationship, and exclude loans driven largely by transactions--mort-
gages and equipment and auto loans, for example--that seem less likely
to involve a relationship between the borrower and the lender.
Our look at the NSSBF data turned up some related evidence. Firms
were asked why they chose to deal with a particular financial institution.
After "convenience," the most common reason for choosing a bank was
that the firm’s owner had some sort of "relationship" with the bank. In
contrast, firms dealt with finance companies primarily because they
were "captive," that is, because they had bought or leased a capital good
from the same company. In sum, personal relationships were far less
important a reason for borrowing from finance companies.12
A recent study by Becketfi and Morris (1993) also bears on this
discussion. Although they are agnostic about whether C&I bank loans
are special or not, they find no evidence that bank loans have become
less special in recent years. If more or better substitutes had flattened the
demand curve for bank loans in the 1980s, they reason, a decline in the
supply of bank loans would have a larger affect on the equilibrium
quantity of loans than before. Yet they find no evidence that increases in
the federal funds rate have had a larger impact on bank borrowing since
1982.
ll They find that the strength of the relationship did not affect the rate charged on the
most recent loan. The small effect of relationships on the interest rates, they argue, could
reflect that banks ration credit through non-price terms.
12 Event studies yield mixed evidence on whether banks are unique among interme-
diaries. James (1987) found that a firm’s share price fell after an announcement that the
firm was replacing a bank loan agreement with a private placement from an insurance
company. Preece and Mullineax (1994a), on the other hand, find a positive share price
response following announcements of a loan agreement from finance companies or
nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies.30 Charles P. Himmelberg and Donald P, Morgan
Insurance Companies versus Banks
Like banks, insurance companies specialize in originating and
holding contracts that require both ex ante and ex post information
production. And like bank loans, these contracts contain covenants and
collateral provisions that seek to provide protection against moral
hazard, as well as to alter the allocation of proceeds in the event of
default. But unlike banks, insurance companies have longer-term liabil-
ities on their balance sheets. The fact that maturity transformation is
costly makes insurance companies an inefficient source of short-term
loans. The short-term liabilities of banks, on the other hand, make them
relatively efficient sources of short-term loans.
~ Carey, Prowse, Rea, and Udell (1993) provide evidence that markets
for private placements and bank loans are segmented by maturity. The
private placements in their sample have a median maturity of nine
years, and no private placement had a maturity of less than one year. In
contrast, 67 percent of all bank loans had maturities shorter than one
year, and essentially none had a maturity greater than seven years.
These facts, combined with our earlier discussion of maturity struc-
ture, suggest that private placements are imperfect substitutes for bank
loans. Moreover, they suggest that banks lend to information-problem-
atic firms for which short-term debt is optimal, while insurance compa-
nies lend to firms for which information problems are small enough to
permit long-term borrowing, but not small enough to access public bond
markets. Carey et al. (1993) provide evidence on this point. For a sample
of firms selected from Compustat, they show that relative to bank
borrowers, the median borrower in the private placement market is
larger (assets of $3.4 billion versus $0.04 billion), is less R&D intensive
(R&D-to-sales ratio of 0.038 versus 0.070), and has a higher percentage
of fixed assets (42 percent versus 31 percent).13
A related argument suggests that short-term bank lending domi-
nates long-term private placements when the lender wants to impose
covenants based on characteristics that are observable but not verifiable
by a third party. When covenants are based on verifiable characteristics,
it is easier for a lender to legally declare a loan to be in default. However,
when the lender can observe that the loan is in default but cannot
convey this information to a third party, short-term debt will be used
because it gives the lender the ability the terminate the loan (Berlin and
Loeys 1988; Hart and Moore 1989). Thus, "in many cases, a short-term
loan without a covenant may dominate a longer-term loan with a
covenant" (Carey et al. 1993).
13 These variables are commonly used in the literature as proxies for information
problems. For additional discussion of these proxies, see the previous section.IS BANK LENDING SPECIAL? 31
Finance Companies versus Banks
Unlike insurance companies, whose preferences for long-term lend-
ing are dictated by their long-term liabilities, finance companies are
relatively free to structure their liabilities either long or short. In
particular, they can assess the contractual requirements of the borrower
(including maturity), and then structure their liabilities accordingly.
Assuming that this flexibility is important, finance companies are better
positioned to make short-term loans that would compete directly with
banks. In practice, while the maturity structure of their lending is indeed
shorter-term, it is not as short as the typical bank loan. Moreover,
significant differences in collateral requirements are found between the
loans made by banks and by finance companies. We argue that these
differences effectively segment the market for business lending (exclud-
ing mortgages) between banks and finance companies.
Broadly characterized, the evidence suggests that finance compa-
nies specialize in "good collateral" lending and leasing. According to the
Federal Reserve Bulletin (August 1995, Table 1.52), leases make up 47
percent of the $157 billion in credit provided by finance companies to
business.14 The balance of finance company lending is niche lending
against assets that have thick secondary markets (and therefore high
liquidation values). On the other hand, leasing or secured loans may not
be an attractive option for firms with firm-specific assets. For example,
leasing is relatively uncommon in the manufacturing sector (Sivarama
and Moyer 1994). In contrast, a significant portion of bank commercial
loans are unsecured (Becketti and Morris 1993). These facts suggest that
relative to finance companies, banks specialize in lending against assets
that are difficult to pledge as collateral.
Given that finance companies specialize in collateral, the nature of
firm assets appears to determine whether firms borrow from banks or
finance companies. Many assets make poor collateral; expenditures for
R&D, advertising, and firm-specific fixed capital create assets that are
difficult or impossible to sell in the event of a loan default. Because these
assets have little value except as part of the firm as a going concern,
the optimal loan contract will substitute tighter covenants and shorter
24 The acceIerated growth in the I980s in part reflects a boom in leasing spurred by the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (Remolena and Wulfekuhler 1992). The Act allowed
simplified and accelerated write-offs of depreciation. Finance companies could use the
write-off to shelter their income while banks could offer only nonoperating leases and
therefore could not shelter their income. The corporate debt buildup later in the ’80s also
increased the demand for leasing, as highly leveraged firms could protect their credit
rating by leasing instead of borrowing.32 Charles P. Himmelberg and Donald P. Morgan
maturity in place of collateral requirements,is These loan characteristics
enhance the benefits of continuous monitoring and place more empha-
sis on the assets’ contribution to cash flow rather than their value on
secondary markets.
What accounts for the respective degrees of specialization between
banks and finance companies? Regulatory restrictions on bank assets
provide one explanation. Remolona and Wulfekuhler (1992) suggest that
the large market share of finance companies in leasing is the combined
outcome of Federal Reserve Regulation Y (which restricted bank leasing)
and dynamic learning economies, through which finance companies
gained valuable knowledge about secondary-market values for large-
asset classes like commercial aircraft, construction equipment, machine
tools, and medical equipment. This asset knowledge gave finance
companies a significant cost advantage over banks in various niche
markets where the nature of the asset being financed permits leasing or
secured lending. 16
With the exception of Remolona and Wulfekuhler (1992), we are not
aware of attempts in the literature to explain the segmentation of loan
markets between banks and finance companies. Specifically, given that
finance companies are successful in markets for leasing and for highly
collateralized loans, why do they not compete with banks in the market
for short-term, unsecured loans? This puzzle is presumably explained
by the bank franchise on deposit-taking. We can think of two reasons
why deposit-taking might lower the cost of making short-term, rela-
tively unsecured loans. First, as Fama (1985) and others have suggested,
if deposit-taking lowers the cost of monitoring the firm’s financial
condition, then it confers an advantage in unsecured lending (especially
for short-term lending). Second, if maturity matching reduces costs,
then deposit-taking makes it cheaper for banks to lend short term. The
large amounts of commercial paper floated by finance companies are
short maturity (30 days, typically), but not as short as a demand deposit.
As long as banks retain their franchise on deposit-taking, they seem
likely to retain their dominant position in the market for short-term,
unsecured C&I lending.17
~ In general, firms with intangible assets will also choose lower debt-equity ratios
(Harris and Raviv 1990). Our analysis considers only the debt choice conditional on the
debt-equity choice.
~ Remolona and Wulfekuhler (1992) also point out that economies of scope could also
provide finance companies with a cost advantage over banks in secured lending. For
example, they note that IBM Credit uses information about the parent’s product plans to
inform its forecasts of residual asset values. On the other hand, they note that GE Capital
successfully entered aircraft leasing even though its parent manufactures only engines.
17 This assumes that innovations in transactions technology will not render deposit-
taking obsolete.IS BANK LENDING SPECIAL? 33
CONCLUSION
While both theoretical and empirical research identify fundamental
differences between intermediated and direct borrowing, more research
is needed on the differences among intermediaries, especially those
between banks and finance companies. Finance companies fund loans
by selling commercial paper and medium-term notes to mutual funds,
which in turn issue shares to savers. Is this "parallel banking system"
(D’Arista 1994) merely an artifact of regulation (for example, the reserve
tax), or has it arisen because of informational economies of scope
between producing and selling capital goods and making loans secured
by those same assets? Does the banks’ franchise on demand deposits,
the most liquid of liabilities, provide sufficient information and other
advantages to stave off finance companies funded by one-month com-
mercial paper?
Boyd and Gertler (1994) stress that most commercial paper is backed
by a standby letter of credit from a bank, suggesting that banks add
value to the market by monitoring issuers (or by providing indirect
access to the discount window). Does this arrangement open a policy
channel to the commercial paper market? Banks are required to hold
capital against standby letters of credit, so a capital shock could affect the
supply of standby letters and the cost of commercial paper.18 Backup
letters do not require reserves, however, so it seems doubtful that open
market operations could directly affect the commercial paper market.
With such questions for future research in mind, we conclude that
bank lending is still special, at least for some business borrowers.
Smaller, lower-quality borrowers still require intensive screening and
monitoring by intermediaries. Some such firms can borrow from insur-
ance companies, but many do not. Only firms with easily secured assets
seem able to borrow from finance companies. For the remainder of
firms, bank lending is still special. Of course, the existence of a lending
channel also requires that monetary or regulatory policy actually change
the supply of bank loans. This topic is considered by other papers at this
conference.
28 D’Arista (1994, p. 456) cites evidence that the imposition of capital requirements
against letters of credit tightened terms of banks’ backup lines for finance company
commercial paper.34 Charles P. Himmelberg and Donald P. Morgan
References
Asquith, Paul, Robert Gertner, and David Sharfstein. 1994. "Anatomy of Financial
Distress." Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 109, pp. 625-58.
Barclay, Michael J. and Clifford W. Smith. 1993. "The Maturity Structure of Corporate
Debt." Mimeo, William E. Simon Graduate School of Business, University of Roch-
ester.
Becketti, Sean and Charles Morris. 1993. "Reduced Form Evidence on the Substitutability
between Bank and Nonbank Loans." Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Mimeo.
Berger, Allen N. and Gregory F. Udell. 1994. "Line of Credit and Relationship Lending in
Small Firm Finance." Mimeo, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Berlin, Mitch and Jan Loeys. 1988. "Bond Covenants and Delegated Monitoring." Journal
of Finance, vol. 43, pp. 397-412.
Bernanke, Ben S. and Alan S. Blinder. 1988. "Credit, Money, and Aggregate Demand."
The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, vol. 78, pp. 435-39.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 1992. "Survey of Terms of Bank
Lending." Statistical release E.2, September.
Boyd, John and Mark Gertler. 1994. "Are Banks Dead? Or Are the Reports Greatly
Exaggerated?" Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Summer, pp.
2-23.
Boyd, John and Edward Prescott. 1986. "Financial Intermediary Coalitions." Review of
Economic Studies, vol. 38, pp. 323-40.
Calomiris, Charles. 1992. "Regulation, Industrial Structure, and Instability in U.S. Bank-
ing: An Historical Perspective." In Structural Change in Banking, eds. M. Klausner and
L.J. White, pp. 19-116. Homewood, IL: Business One Irwin.
--. 1994. "Is the Discount Window Necessary? A Penn-Central Perspective." Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, vol. 76, pp. 31-56.
Calomiris, Charles, Charles Himmelberg, and Paul Wachtel. 1995. "Commercial Paper,
Corporate Finance, and the Business Cycle: A Microeconomic Perspective." Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 42, pp. 203-50.
Carey, Mark, Stephen Prowse, John Rea, and Gregory Udell. 1993. "The Economics of the
Private Placement Market." Staff Study No. 166, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
Crabbe, Lee, Mitchell Pickering, and Stephen Prowse. 1990. "Recent Developments in
Corporate Finance." Federal Reserve Bulletin, August, pp. 593-603.
D’Arista, Jane. 1994. The Evolution of U.S. Finance, Volume II, Restructuring Institutions and
Markets. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Dennis, William J. Jr., William C. Dunkelberg, and Jeffrey S. Van Hulle. 1988. "Small
Business and Banks: The United States." National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness, Washington, D.C.
Diamond, Douglas W. 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring." Review
of Economic Studies, vol. 51, pp. 393-414.
--. 1991a. "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice Between Bank Loans and Directly
Placed Debt." Journal of Political Economy, vol. 99, pp. 689-721.
--. 1991b. "Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk." Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ics, vol. 106, pp. 709-38.
Edwards, Franklin R. 1993. "Financial Markets in Transition--Or the Decline in Commer-
cial Banking." In Changing Capital Markets: Implications for Monetary Policy, Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
Edwards, Franklin R. and Frederic S. Mishkin. 1994. "The Decline of Traditional Banking:
Implications for Financial Stability and Regulatory Policy." Paine Webber Working
Paper Series No. 94-26, Columbia Business School.
Fama, Eugene F. 1985. "What’s Different About Banks?" Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.
15, pp. 29-39.
Gertler, Mark and Simon Gilchrist. 1993. "The Role of Credit Market Imperfections in the
Monetary Transmission Mechanism: Arguments and Evidence." Scandinavian Journal
of Economics, vol. 95, pp. 43-64.
--. 1994. "Monetary Policy, Business Cycles, and the Behavior of Small Manufactur-
ing Firms." Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 109, pp. 309-40.IS BANK LENDING SPECIAL? 35
Gertler, Mark and R. Glenn Hubbard. 1988. "Financial Factors in Business Fluctuations."
In Financial Market Volatility: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Recommendations, pp.
33-71. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
Gilson, Stuart C., John Kose, and Larry H.P. Lang. 1990. "Troubled Debt Restructurings."
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 27, pp. 315-53.
Gorton, Gary and George Pennacchi. 1990. "Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity
Creation." Journal of Finance, vol. 45, pp. 49-71.
Harris, Milton and Arthur Raviv. 1990. "Capital Structure and the Informational Role of
Debt." Journal of Finance, vol. 45, pp. 321-49.
Hart, Oliver and John Moore. 1989. "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of
Debt." Discussion Paper No. 57, London School of Economics.
Hoshi, Takeo, Anil Kashyap, and David Sharfstein. 1990. "The Role of Banks in Reducing
the Costs of Financial Distress." Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 27, pp. 67-88.
--. 1991. "Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese
Industrial Groups." Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 106, pp. 33-60.
Houston, Joel and Christopher James. 1995. "Bank Information Monopolies and the Mix
of Private and Public Debt Claims." Mimeo, University of Florida.
Hubbard, R. Glenn. 1990. Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
--. 1994. "Is There A ’Credit Channel’ For Monetary Policy?" Paper prepared for
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Conference, October 20-21.
--. 1995. "Capital Market Imperfections and Investment." Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, forthcoming.
James, Christopher. 1987. "Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans." Journal of
Financial Economics, vol. 19, pp. 217-35.
Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling. 1976. "Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure." Journal of Financial Economies, vol.
3, pp. 3O5-67.
Kahan, Marcel and Bruce Tuckman. 1993. "Private Vs. Public Lending: Evidence From
Covenants." New York University, Salomon Center, Working Paper No. 93--54.
Lumer, Scott and John J. McConnell. 1989. "Further Evidence on the Bank Lending
Process and the Capital Market Response to Bank Loan Agreements." Journal of
Financial Economics, vol. 25, pp. 99-122.
Morgan, Donald. 1995. "Bank Monitoring Mitigates Information Problems: New Evidence
Using the Financial Covenants in Bank Loan Commitments." Paine Webber Working
Paper Series, No. 95-11, Columbia Business School.
Myers, Stewart C. 1977. "Determinants of Corporate Borrowing." Journal of Financial
Economics, vol. 5, pp. 147-75.
Petersen, Mitchell and Raghuram Rajan. 1994. "The Benefits of Lending Relationships:
Evidence from Small Business Data." Journal of Finance, vol. 49, pp. 3-38.
¯ 1995. "The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships."
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 110, pp. 407-43.
Preece, Dianna C. and Donald J. Mullineaux. 1994a. "Monitoring by Financial Intermedi-
aries: Banks vs. Nonbanks." Journal of Financial Services Research, vol. 8, pp. 193-202.
--. 1994b. "Monitoring, Loan Renegotiability, and Firm Value: The Role of Lending
Syndicates." The Journal of Banking and Finance, forthcoming.
Rajan, Raghuram. 1992. "Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Relationship and
Armslength Debt." Journal of Finance, vol. 47, pp. 1367-1400.
Rajan, Raghuram and Luigi Zingales. 1993. "The Determinants of Capital Structure:
Evidence from International Data." Working Paper, University of Chicago Graduate
School of Business.
Remolena, Eli M. and Kurt C. Wulfekuhler. 1992. "Finance Companies, Bank Competi-
tion, and Niche Markets." Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review,
Summer, pp. 25-38.
Scott, Jonathan A. and William C. Dunkelberg. 1985. "Credit, Banks, and Small Busi-
ness." National Federation of Independent Business, Washington, D.C.
Simonson, Donald G. 1994. "Business Strategies: Bank Commercial Lending vs. Finance
Company Lending." Jerome Levy Institute Working Paper No. 112.36 Charles P. Himmelberg and Donald P. Morgan
Sivarama, Krishnan V. and R. Charles Moyer. 1994. "Bankruptcy Costs and the Financial
Leasing Decision." Financial Management, vol. 23, pp. 31-42.
Slovin, Myron, Shane A. Johnson, and John Glascock. 1992. "Firm Size and the Infor-
1-nation Content of Bank Loan Agreements." Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 18,
pp. 1057-71.
Slovin, Myron, Marie Sushka, and John Polonchek. 1993. "The Value of Bank Durability:
Borrowers as Banks’ Stakeholders." Journal of Finance, vol. 48, March, pp. 247-66.
Smith, Cifford W. 1986. "Investment Banking and the Capital Acquisition Process." Journal
of Financial Economics, vol. 15, pp. 3-30.
--. 1993. "A Perspective on Accounting-Based Debt Covenant Violations." The
Accounting Review, vol. 68, pp. 289-303.
Smith, Clifford W. and Jerold B. Warner. 1979. "On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of
Bond Covenants." Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 7, pp. 117-61.
Sweeney, Patricia Ann. 1994. "Debt-Covenant Violations and Managers’ Accounting
Responses." Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 17, pp. 281-308.
Zinbarg, Edward D. 1995. "The Private Placement Loan Agreement." Financial Analysts
Journal, July-August, pp. 33-52.Rober~ R. Glauber*
For bank lending to provide a distinct mechanism for the transmis-
sion of monetary policy, banks must occupy a special niche for some
category of borrowers. This paper by Charles Himmelberg and Donald
Morgan focuses directly on that issue and is an appropriate place to start
this conference. My brief comments are directed to three questions
raised by the paper. First, in the past has a discernible category of
borrowers been dependent on bank loans? Second, are these borrowers
likely to continue to depend on banks, or will nonbank substitutes
compete effectively for them? Third, how effective is this bank lending
channel as a transmission mechanism for monetary policy; specifically,
does it reinforce what the Fed is seeking to do through other policy
initiatives, or does it act at cross-purposes?
Using both theoretical and empirical evidence, the authors show,
quite persuasively I believe, that a well-defined class of borrowers is and
has been markedly dependent upon banks. This important group is
characterized as small and non-capital-intensive firms and includes
high-tech and rapidly growing companies. They may be responsible for
only 28 percent of employment, but they create more than their share of
jobs in cyclical expansions.
The theoretical support for identifying this group rests primarily on
agency cost considerations. Because less information is published for
them, smaller firms (and especially those non-capital-intensive firms
whose value depends more on intangible assets, which provide less
satisfactory collateral for loans) are more subject to classical agency costs
*Adjunct Lecturer, Center for Business and Government, Kennedy School of Gov-
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than other firms. Naturally, both these firms and the market seek to
reduce those agency costs, and one effective way to reduce them is by
creating tight, detailed covenants in bank lending contracts. Intermedi-
aries in general, and banks in particular, are well-equipped and have
specialized in creating,, negotiating, monitoring, and where necessary,
renegotiating these contracts. That is the niche intermediaries occupy,
and banks have become extremely skilled in that role. These skills have
contributed importantly to reducing the cost of lending. The empirical
support in the paper, beyond a review of past evidence, is contained in
a probit analysis of new data confirming this image of a special category
of bank borrowers: small, growing, non-capital-intensive firms.
But so much for the past; as the authors say, banks have been
special until now. The question remains, will they be special in the
future? First of all, how about competition for small-business lending
from other intermediaries, specifically life insurance companies and
finance companies? Looking forward, I am less convinced that banks
will successfully hold off this competition.
First, why cannot life insurance companies offer serious competi-
tion? The major thrust of the argument is that the maturity mismatch
that would occur when their naturally long-term liabilities are set off
against short-term loans to these small, growing firms has kept insur-
ance companies out of this business. Well, if that has been the reason in
the past, I think it less likely to be a reason in the future. Techniques
using derivative instruments are now available to transform maturities
and reconcile mismatches with low risk and at very low cost. So if all
that was keeping insurance companies out of short-term, small-business
lending is the maturity mismatch, that is hardly going to be a great
barrier in the future. There are, of course, other forces that may keep life
insurance companies out of this market, not least the consolidation and
continuing competitive pressure confronting insurers. But I would not
rely on maturity mismatch to keep insurers from competing with banks
for short-term business loans.
Finance companies, on the other hand, have already become an
extraordinarily important competitor of banks. In the late ’80s and early
"90s, finance companies were providing short-term business loans at
three times the rate of banks. It is true, historically, that these interme-
diaries have specialized in collateralized lending. Generally they grew
from captive lenders of manufacturing firms, as the authors note. But
in recent years, a number of the larger finance companies (for example,
General Electric Credit Corp.) have become increasingly skilled at
making non-collateralized, cash-flow loans and, I suspect, will continue
to do so. The maturity issue is not significant here. There is no
conceptual reason why finance companies will not continue to give
banks serious competition for small-business lending.
Indeed, among intermediaries, what gives banks a competitiveDISCUSSION 39
advantage? The argument is, first, banks benefit from economies of
scope derived from deposit-taking, which provides information useful
in monitoring. No doubt that is true, but against that advantage one
must consider the daunting list of disadvantages of being a bank. The
list includes the reserve tax, deposit insurance rates, and the added
burden that regulations impose, particularly the micro-management
regulations imposed recently by FDICIA, and other regulations like
CRA. Important regulatory costs are imposed on banks, as compared
with nonbank intermediaries.
These disadvantages are quite substantial, even compared with the
advantages that banks have. Indeed, when I was at the U.S. Treasury
Department, several heads of large finance companies met with me to
say they could not care less what kind of banking legislation we passed,
they had absolutely no interest in becoming a regulated bank. They
were quite happy to raise their funding as a non-government-insured
borrower in the capital markets and lend it outside the regulation that is
imposed on banks. Banks confront other intermediaries armed with
some advantages but also carrying a great deal of added cost.
A second challenge to banks, and to bank lending as a channel,
comes from the capital markets themselves. Exploiting information
technology that supports the work of rating agencies, capital markets
have relentlessly substituted direct lending via securities for intermedi-
ated lending, starting with large, high-quality borrowers and moving
on to large, lower-quality firms (that is, the junk bond market). Conse-
quently, intermediaries have been forced into a narrow corner lending
to small firms, a trend well described in the paper. To the question,
"Will this corner become even narrower in the future?" my bet is "Yes.’"
Securitization of small-business loans is difficult, to be sure, because of
the heterogeneity in information demands, but I think it will continue to
make progress. More and more of this niche will be carved out by the
capital markets themselves, and the bank lending channel will become
further attenuated.
The last question I want to address is this: Just how effective is the
bank lending channel at transmitting Fed policy? What goes through
this channel? Does this channel support Fed policy or work against it,
at cross-purposes with that policy? On this issue, a good deal of the
relevant research has been done here at the Boston Fed. The experience
of the early ’90s, as documented by Peek and Rosengren (1995) and by
Randall (1993), suggests that, while Fed policy during the period was
stimulative, supervisory and examination policy was operating to re-
strain lending.
Reacting to a variety of forces, not the least of which were political,
examiners clamped down on bank lending just when monetary policy
was seeking to be stimulative. Several actions have been cited: Leverage
ratios were raised, classification standards were tightened. Examination40 Robert R. Glauber
and supervisory policies plainly made it harder for banks to support the
recovery. These policies were, simply, pro-cyclical. That, I believe,
worked against the forces Fed monetary policy was trying to transmit.
Of course, the problem lay not only with regulators, supervisors, and
examiners; the banks themselves had a hand in turning the lending
channel against the recovery. Banks failed to accumulate sufficient
capital in good times to act as a buffer in bad times. They took on
marginal loans in the expansion, which came home to roost in the
recession.
In sum, there is much evidence that banks and regulators have
acted to make supervisory policy operate cyclically, tightening in down-
turns and loosening in expansions. With a pro-cyclical supervisory
policy, the lending channel becomes a transmission mechanism for
monetary policy, but operates in reverse.
Bank lending as a proper transmission mechanism for monetary
policy requires more than the convincing evidence in this paper that
banks have carved out a special lending niche in the past. The future will
likely see a further erosion of that niche. And, more disturbing, there is
evidence that bank lending as a transmission mechanism may operate
to undermine monetary policy, at least in part, during periods of both
stimulation and restraint.
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Bank of Boston Conference Series No. 37, pp. 17-64.Bank lending is "special" if firms do not have close substitutes for
bank loans. An important premise of this paper by Charles P. Himmel-
berg and Donald P. Morgan is that bank lending has to be special for
monetary policy to be transmitted through banks (the so-called "’lending
channel").
To understand if this premise is justified, we must first understand
why one might think that monetary policy could be transmitted through
banks. This is what I make of the received view: The monetary authority
increases short-term interest rates. Transactions deposits fall off because
the opportunity cost to depositors of holding money increases. A bank
has to make up the funding shortfall through other sources. If transac-
tions deposits were perfectly substitutable with these other sources,
there would be no effect on the bank’s assets. But if transactions
deposits are special for some reason (for example, they enjoy a govern-
ment insurance subsidy), then other forms of funding may not easily
replace the lost deposits, because of capital market imperfections. Bank
assets would then shrink, affecting securities holdings first, then bank
loans. Finally, firms that do not have access to other financial institu-
tions or markets-~because of agency or asymmetric information prob--
lems--will find their investment credit-constrained, and real activity will
be affected.
The necessary conditions for the "lending channel," it would seem,
are as follo~vs. (1) Banks do not have perfect substitutes for transaction
deposits, so monetary policy affects bank liabilities and thus bank assets
(that is, loans). (2) Firms do not have perfect substitutes for bank loans:
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Banks are special because they solve agency and asymmetric informa-
tion problems at the firm level that other financial institutions cannot
solve. This paper focuses on (2). But as an aside, I wonder if (1) is
necessary? In other words, a fair amount of research effort (see the
references in the paper) has been spent recently investigating whether
banks themselves suffer from agency and asymmetric information
problems, so that (insured) transaction deposits are indeed a special
source of funding. But could the lending channel work directly off the
asset side of banks, without necessarily flowing through the liability
side?
The reason I think this is important is that most theories of banks
(see, for example, Diamond 1984) would suggest that banks exist because
they somehow convince investors that agency and asymmetric informa-
tion problems will be low at the bank level. Otherwise, banks would
simply add another layer of costs between the initial saver and the
ultimate user of funds. So a theory of transmission of monetary policy
that requires substantial agency costs and information problems at both
the bank level and the firm level raises questions about why banks exist
in the first place.
Here is one way monetary policy could work directly through the
bank asset side. Suppose reserves are special. This could be motivated
in a number of ways that do not require banks to be constrained on the
liability side. For instance, suppose banks may be faced with a random
demand for repayment by short-term creditors (not necessarily insured
depositors). Banks would want to hold liquid assets to insure against
this, because the price of liquidity fluctuates over time and banks do not
want to raise funds when the price of liquidity is too high. Thus, banks
have a demand for liquid assets and perhaps for reserves, which are
more liquid than any other asset. Once banks do have such a demand,
it is obvious that by increasing the short-term interest rate (and under
the assumption that bank lending rates do not immediately adjust in full
measure), the monetary authority reduces the opportunity cost to banks
of maintaining a liquid reserve. Thus, loans decrease and the bank’s
holdings of short-term securities increase.
I do not claim that monetary policy does not affect the liability side.
But if it works directly through the asset side also, then monetary policy
may be transmitted through a variety of financial institutions that need
liquidity, not just banks. The extent to which it would affect their
lending would depend only on the extent to which they need liquidity.
For instance, life insurance firms would be less affected than would
banks.
This has an important bearing on the paper. From a firm’s point of
view, credit from a bank and credit from a finance company may be
close substitutes (they both are institutional investors, capable of mon-
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finance companies. If monetary policy is transmitted via the liability side
of banks, it will have less and less effect as bank lending is displaced by
finance company lending. But if it works directly off the asset side of
financial institutions, to the extent that both finance companies and
banks need liquidity, monetary policy would continue to affect lending
even if (or when) banks decline in importance.
Let us move now to Himmelberg and Morgan’s paper. They argue
that institutional lending is special because institutions, unlike public
investors, can enter into long-term relationships with borrowers that
result in a richer set of contractual possibilities. Institutions also enjoy
scale economies in monitoring and lower coordination costs than public
investors in effecting changes in managerial actions. Furthermore, banks
are special among institutions because banks have information from
deposit accounts. A franchise in offering short-term deposits (because of
entry restrictions/deposit insurance subsidy/access to payment system/
access to discount window) gives banks a preference for liquid assets
and a comparative advantage in making short-term monitored loans.
Finally, the structure of bank assets and liabilities minimizes the cost of
intermediafion.
The paper, however, does not test much of this. It examines the
following two issues. First, what determines whether a firm gets rated?
The authors regress an indicator showing whether a firm is rated against
explanatory variables such as size and capital intensity. They conclude
that only large firms with tangible, collateralizable assets are likely to be
rated and have access to public debt markets. While I believe the result,
one must be careful in interpreting such regressions, because a number
of firms may be quite capable of accessing the public debt markets but
may not bother to get a rating. American Home Products, through much
of the 1970s, is an example.
Second, the authors ask what determines how much short-term
debt a firm uses. They conclude that agency problems restrict firms with
high R&D and high growth to short-term borrowing. Of course, one has
to be careful in concluding that short-term debt is institutional finance,
because much of it could be commercial paper. Nevertheless, from this
and other studies, it seems reasonable to conclude that institutional
financing is likely to be more valuable and available for some firms than
public financing. But are banks special among institutions? The paper
is less illuminating here.
Finally, if banks are special, why has bank lending as a fraction of
total financing been declining over the 1980s? Some argue that vast
increases in computing power and informational technology have made
monitoring the borrower easier for the public investor, and this is why
banks are losing their comparative advantage. But since banks also
could avail themselves of this technology, it is not clear why bank
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markets have become more receptive to issuing firms. Since this reduces
the value of long-term banking relationships, it could lead to an increase
in disintermediation. Another possibility is that banks are valuable only
as long as they have a deposit franchise. Since the value of that franchise
has declined, the role of banks has declined. Which one of these pos-
sibilities (if any) explains the decline of bank market share awaits future
research.
To conclude, substantial evidence is found in this paper and in
others that financial institutions can overcome agency and information
problems at the firm level. Whether such institutions need to be banks
is debatable. What is even less clear is whether there is a lending channel
for monetary policy, and whether such a channel operates through
banks only. Obviously, more research is needed.
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